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Not every amount that benefits an injured party can be deducted from compensation due under an insurance policy.

Dec 27, 2023

Not every amount that benefits an injured party can be deducted from compensation due under an insurance policy.

From: Attorney Shlomi Hadar - John Geva, Hadar & Co. - Lawyers and Mediators


After a request for further hearing, the Supreme Court upheld its ruling that since the state has no right of recourse against the insurer for the survivor's pension paid by it, the survivor's pension may not be deducted.

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Not every amount that benefits an injured party can be deducted from compensation due under an insurance policy.

background:

A family father who served in the IDF as a career officer until early 2001 retired and began receiving a government-funded pension. At the beginning of 2007, the deceased began working at "Egged" until a traffic accident occurred, leading to his tragic death. After the death of the deceased, his widow began receiving a survivors’ pension from the state and payments from the National Insurance Institute (Bituach Leumi).


Following the deceased’s passing, his dependents and heirs filed a claim in the Tel Aviv Magistrates’ Court (T.A. 2380-08-10) under the Compensation to Road Accident Victims Law, 1975. In this proceeding, it was ruled that the amount of damages was lower than the survivors’ pension and National Insurance payments, which were to be deducted; therefore, the claim was dismissed.


The dependents and heirs appealed the Magistrates’ Court ruling to the District Court, arguing primarily that the survivors’ pension should not have been deducted from the amount of damages awarded. The District Court (A.A. 048891-10-19) dismissed the appeal, ruling that the deduction of the survivors’ pension was legally correct. A further appeal to the Supreme Court overturned the District Court’s decision, and its ruling remained in effect after a request for further hearing was denied.

The parties' arguments in the appeal:

The parties' arguments in the appeal:

The heirs sought to make a distinction between an annuity paid to the deceased's family by the state without the state having the right to go back and sue the insurance company for the compensation due for the traffic accident, as opposed to payments for which the state has the right to demand that the insurance company reimburse it for amounts it paid to the deceased's family following his death.


According to the heirs' approach, a situation in which they receive "overcompensation" (meaning compensation higher than the compensation for death due to a car accident) should be preferred over a situation in which the tortfeasor/insurance company pays for only part of the compensation.


According to the insurance company, failure to deduct the survivor's pension will result in double compensation and, contrary to the principle of restoring the situation to its former state on Shabbat.

The heirs sought to distinguish between a pension paid by the state to the deceased’s family where the state has no right to recover those payments from the motor insurer, and payments for which the state is entitled to seek reimbursement from the insurer following the deceased’s death.

In the heirs’ view, it was preferable for them to receive “overcompensation,” meaning an amount exceeding the compensation payable for death in a road accident, rather than allowing the wrongdoer or insurer to pay only part of the compensation.

The insurer argued that failing to deduct the survivors’ pension would result in double compensation, contrary to the principle of restoring the injured party to the position they would have occupied had the wrongful act not occurred.

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Decision:

The court first noted that the deduction is therefore a product of case law, which originates from the right of the benefactor who pays the benefit to return to the harmed party in a claim for indemnity (hereinafter: the right of recourse ). Given a right of recourse, the absence of a deduction may result in the harmed party being liable for double compensation – which is contrary to fundamental principles of tort law.


However, when the benefactor does not have a right of recourse against the harmer, there is no concern about the harmer's overcharging as mentioned above, and then the basis falls below the justification for the deduction.


The Supreme Court ruled that in the matter examined by it, there is no dispute that the state has no right of recourse against the insurer for the payment of the survivor's pension to the applicant. Therefore, in the absence of an anchor in the Pensions Law for the deduction of the survivor's pension from the amount of compensation, the court concluded that there is no reason to deduct it. This conclusion was reinforced in light of the provisions of Section 64(d) of the Pensions Law, which states that the survivor's pension may not be deducted.


Therefore, it was determined that, in the absence of a specific legal provision directing the deduction of benefits received by the injured party from the compensation awarded to the tortfeasor, the basis for such deduction is the right of restitution of the benefactor against the tortfeasor, and the principle according to which the tortfeasor should not be required to pay compensation that exceeds the damage he caused. In any case, in circumstances where the benefactor does not have the right of restitution as stated, the main basis for deduction is omitted, namely "no indemnity - no deduction."


It was further noted that there is an additional purpose for deduction, which focuses on the damage, and is to prevent compensation that exceeds the damage caused to him and his "enrichment", so to speak, in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of restoring the situation to its former state. In accordance with this principle, the compensation awarded to the injured party is supposed to place him, as close as possible in monetary terms, in the position he would have been in had the wrongful act not occurred, and no further. By virtue of this principle, it is ostensibly permissible to order the deduction of any benefit received by the injured party from the amount of compensation awarded in his favor – even without regard to the question of whether the beneficiary has a right of recourse against the tortfeasor.


However, the court ruled that the non-deduction of the survivors' pension from the amount of compensation does not contradict the principle of restoration of the situation to its former state. First, it was noted that the argument that the non-deduction of the survivors' pension entitles the survivors and the estate to double compensation, contrary to the principle of restoration of the situation to its former state, ignores the fundamental distinction between the separate legal entities: the dependents - who are entitled to the survivors' pension; versus the heirs who follow in the shoes of the injured party - who are entitled to compensation for damages for the "lost years". Second, the survivors' pension is paid to the appellant due to the mere death of the deceased and in accordance with his working conditions. In contrast, the compensation in the tort claim for the "lost years" is paid to the estate, which follows in the shoes of the deceased, due to his death as a result of the accident. Third, specifically, with respect to an insurance contract, as in our case, the court found it difficult to say that the non-deduction of the benefit results in the "enrichment" of the injured party, in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of restoring the situation to its former state. From the perspective of the injured party, the insurance money is not a regular "benefit," but is paid to him in exchange for a premium he paid to the insurer (the benefactor).


Finally, it was also noted that when the normal balance in the "triangle of relationships" between the harmer, the injured party, and the benefactor is violated, there is justification in certain circumstances for the injured party to benefit from this situation, not the harmer.

Decision:

The Court first noted that the deduction is a judicially developed rule, rooted in the right of the party paying the benefit to seek reimbursement from the wrongdoer (the “right of recourse”). Where such a right exists, failing to deduct the benefit could require the wrongdoer to pay compensation twice, contrary to fundamental principles of tort law.

However, where the benefit provider has no right of recourse against the wrongdoer, there is no risk of the wrongdoer paying more than the loss caused. The justification for the deduction therefore falls away.

The Supreme Court held that, in the case before it, there was no dispute that the state had no right of recourse against the insurer for the survivors’ pension paid to the applicant. Consequently, in the absence of a statutory basis in the Pensions Law for deducting that pension from the damages award, the Court concluded that no deduction should be made. Section 64(d) of the Pensions Law provided further support for this conclusion.

The Court therefore held that, absent a specific statutory provision requiring benefits received by the injured person to be deducted from the damages payable by the wrongdoer, the basis for deduction is the benefit provider’s right of recourse and the principle that the wrongdoer should not pay compensation exceeding the damage caused. Where no such right of recourse exists, the principal basis for deduction falls away: “No reimbursement, no deduction.”

The Court also noted a further purpose of deduction, focused on the injured person: preventing compensation exceeding their loss and their resulting supposed “enrichment,” contrary to the principle of restoring the injured person to their original position. Under this principle, damages should, as far as reasonably possible in monetary terms, place the injured person in the position they would have occupied had the tort not occurred, and no better. At first sight, this would require deducting every benefit received from the damages awarded, regardless of whether the benefit provider has a right of recourse against the wrongdoer.

Nevertheless, the Court held that not deducting the survivors’ pension was consistent with this principle.

First, the argument that failing to deduct the pension gives the survivors and the estate double compensation overlooks the fundamental distinction between separate legal entities: the dependants, who are entitled to the survivors’ pension, and the heirs standing in the deceased’s shoes, who are entitled to damages for the “lost years.”

Second, the survivors’ pension is paid to the appellant because of the deceased’s death and under the terms of his employment. By contrast, damages for the “lost years” are paid to the estate, which stands in the deceased’s shoes, because his death resulted from the accident.

Third, specifically in the context of an insurance contract, as in this case, the Court found it difficult to characterize the absence of a deduction as “enrichment” inconsistent with restoring the injured person to their original position. From the injured person’s perspective, insurance proceeds are not an ordinary benefit: they are paid in return for premiums paid to the insurer, which provides the benefit.

Finally, the Court noted that, where the usual balance in the relationship between the wrongdoer, the injured person, and the benefit provider is disrupted, circumstances may justify allowing the injured person, rather than the wrongdoer, to benefit.

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Not every amount that benefits an injured party can be deducted from compensation due under an insurance policy.

End of the matter

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It was ruled that since the state has no right of recourse against the insurer for the survivors' pension paid by it to the appellant, the survivors' pension may not be deducted.

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Not every amount that benefits an injured party can be deducted from compensation due under an insurance policy.
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Not every amount that benefits an injured party can be deducted from compensation due under an insurance policy.
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