top of page
Itzick Simon
English Logo

The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future

Jan 29, 2024

The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future

By: Itzik Simon


The Iron Swords War raised numerous questions regarding the resilience of residential reinforced security rooms (Mamadim) against threats that are not strictly ballistic (such as rockets or mortars). This was especially highlighted during the October 7 incursions, when attackers reached the doors of homes and Mamadim in the Gaza envelope communities and southern cities.


Do Mamadim truly provide adequate protection against threats like small-arms fire, explosives, fires, smoke, and even anti-tank weapons? How suitable are Mamadim for extended periods of occupancy?


To explore the issue, we conducted a brief interview with Dr. Benny Barush, a protection expert and lecturer in structural engineering at Ariel University’s Civil Engineering Department. Dr. Barush previously served as Director of the Building Division at the Israeli Standards Institute. He has extensive experience in the field and has visited Gaza envelope communities to study, analyze, and draw lessons on Mamadim performance in unprecedented scenarios. His work includes drafting recommendations on possible lessons learned and developing operational steps that are both feasible and actionable.

​

The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future

The residential protected space as a security room

First and foremost, Dr. Barush emphasizes that the issue of reinforced security rooms (Mamadim) “became central” during the events of October 7 because people perceived them as safe shelters. “The rush to the Mamadim was primarily triggered by the sirens,” he explains. “It quickly became clear that the missiles and rockets were not the main threat. A large portion of the population found themselves taking shelter in protected spaces during the ground incursions. People barricaded themselves in Mamadim, and in some cases remained there for dozens of hours.”


Until now, when the threats facing us were purely conventional and not unconventional (since the first Gulf War), and in most parts of the country they were limited in scope, the majority of the population had no need to stay in protected spaces for extended periods (except for sleeping).


“One of the clear and prominent conclusions we have about Mamadim after October 7,” says Dr. Barush, “is the need to adapt them for much longer stays. It’s important to know that this can be done easily, even based on the existing regulations, standards, and specifications approved in the field of civil protection.”

Are the residential protected space protected from small arms fire?

Are the residential protected space protected from small arms fire?

A residential protected spaces resistance to small arms fire depends on the type of door it has, with two types of doors - regular and "enhanced." Only the enhanced doors, which are thicker, will provide protection against small arms fire depending on its type. 


 The "enhanced" doors have been on the market for about a decade and are intended for conventional threats with bullets and shrapnel, but most residential protected spaces are not equipped with them . In many cases in the settlements surrounded by bullets, BMDs with regular light doors have been penetrated and caused serious injuries to those inside.


A protected room’s resistance to small arms fire depends on its door type. There are two types: standard doors and doors with enhanced protection. Only the thicker, enhanced doors provide protection against small arms fire, depending on the type of weapon and ammunition.

Doors with enhanced protection have been available for approximately a decade and were designed to withstand conventional threats involving blast pressure and fragments. However, most protected rooms are not equipped with them. In many cases in communities near the Gaza border, bullets penetrated protected rooms fitted with lightweight standard doors, causing serious injuries to those inside.

​

Fire and arson resistance of the building

"I arrived near the outbreak of the war for a tour of the surrounding communities that I will never forget," says Dr. Brosh. "We were exposed to cases in which terrorists set fire to the house with the intention of causing death and damage to property, and more than once we saw evidence of attempts to break into the MMAD using explosives and mainly building sabotage." 


 The fire usually did not penetrate into the BM when the doors remained closed, although the smoke, which is dangerous in itself, sometimes penetrated. Possibly through open ventilation ducts. The penetration of the smoke led in certain situations to escape through the window and exposure to terrorists in the open space. 


 "We found that sealing rubber partially survived even direct fire, in the event that the door was open and exposed to it. When the door was closed and even more sealed, the rubber was very helpful in preventing smoke from entering. Since there is often an external entrance to the fire station, sometimes due to protective walls required by law, the amount of furniture and accessories near the door is sparse, and thus the fire had nothing to hold on to near the fire station door. Ventilation and filtration systems have the power to prevent smoke from entering from within the apartment, as occurred in the ground attack. Similarly, these systems also help reduce smoke penetration due to an operating mechanism that involves creating positive pressure in the room. Ventilation and filtration systems may generally help in refreshing the air and reducing heat load."


Fire and arson resistance of the building

“Shortly after the outbreak of the war, I visited communities near the Gaza border on a tour I will never forget,” says Dr. Brosh. “We encountered cases where terrorists had set homes on fire with the intention of killing people and damaging property. We also repeatedly saw evidence of attempts to breach reinforced protected rooms using explosive charges, particularly demolition blocks.”

Fire generally did not enter the protected rooms when their doors remained closed. Smoke, however, which is dangerous in its own right, sometimes penetrated, possibly through open ventilation pipes. In some cases, smoke infiltration forced occupants to escape through the window, exposing them to terrorists outside.

“We found that rubber seals partially survived even direct exposure to flames where the door had been left open. When the door was closed, and particularly when properly sealed, the rubber was highly effective in preventing smoke from entering.

“Protected rooms often have an external entrance lobby, sometimes because of protective walls required by law. As a result, there is generally little furniture or other material near the door, leaving little for a fire to feed on immediately outside it.

“Ventilation and filtration systems can prevent smoke from entering from elsewhere in the apartment, as occurred during the ground attack. These systems also help reduce smoke infiltration by creating positive pressure inside the room. More generally, ventilation and filtration systems may help refresh the air and reduce heat buildup.”

Points for improvement and thinking for the future

Points for improvement and thinking for the future

The MMDs in the surrounding settlements and cities in the western Negev have proven resilient in the face of the threats that have come knocking on their doors. On the other hand, there is much room for improvement, and Dr. Brosh points out a number of points that are worth considering going forward:


· Installing a "wet" room that includes a sink, toilet, and shower: Long-stay accommodation units – The events of October 7th emphasized the need to find solutions for long-stay accommodation units. Dr. Brosh believes that accommodation units should include a wet unit with a toilet, sink, and even a shower. He is not the only one, by the way, and a bill was recently submitted on the subject.

· Deadbolt locking – The option to lock a door, especially from the inside, already exists on most apartment doors in Israel. Deadbolt door locking may prevent manual or mechanical break-ins. This is a solution that can be implemented relatively easily because the additional development required is not large. Dr. Brosh emphasizes that it is necessary to ensure that the locking device will not damage the door's tightness and will not be one that could detach from the door and be thrown into the room under the door at a high level. During the ground raid, many residents in the enclosure were forced to hold the handle and a lock could certainly have helped. Especially when holding the handle involved exposure to small arms fire that penetrates a tin door that is not "enhanced."

· Internet communication – Many military bases suffer from reception and communication problems due to the reinforced concrete walls. There are relatively simple solutions to this problem, such as wired connections or amplifiers that should be considered for installation.

· "Enhanced" doors – If it is decided that the threat of small arms fire will join the other threats that the MMAD is required to face, reinforced doors whose development has been completed are an element that must be promoted and even improved. A reinforced door provides protection against small arms and sometimes even against sabotage and explosive devices.

· Regular maintenance – Many apartment buildings in Israel are not properly maintained. Sometimes the door does not close or closes with difficulty to a sealed state, as does the steel window. It is recommended to increase awareness of the issue of maintenance based on professional factors and in any case to be careful to check the integrity of the frame products before handing over the apartments. Many of those who carried out renovations and "sabotaged" the integrity and level of protection of the apartment building and its components are now guilty of a sin, and efforts are required to restore the apartment building to its suitability – which is not always possible.

Periodic inspections and approvals of proper operation – At the stage of receiving Form 4 for the building, the inspection of the proper operation of the building and its accessories is carried out by the GA, and the GA's approval is a condition for occupancy. In light of the events of October 7, it seems that performing a periodic inspection, repairing the rejects and receiving a proper operation certificate once every few years is mandatory as one of the lessons learned. At this stage, it will be possible to consider replacing a light door with a reinforced door, replacing rubber seals, etc. See the form for the MMAD Proper Operation Report in order to receive Form 4, from which you can learn about some of the necessary inspections - link

The reinforced protected rooms (MAMADs) in communities near the Gaza border and cities in the western Negev demonstrated resilience against the threats they faced. Nevertheless, there is considerable room for improvement. Dr. Brosh identifies several points worth considering:

  • Adding a Wet Room with a Sink, Toilet, and Shower: Protected Rooms for Extended Stays: The events of 7 October highlighted the need for protected rooms suitable for prolonged occupancy. Dr. Brosh believes they should include a sanitary unit with a toilet, sink, and even a shower. He is not alone: a bill addressing this issue was recently introduced.

  • Locking Protected Rooms: Most apartment entrance doors in Israel can already be locked, particularly from the inside. A lock on a protected room door could prevent forced entry by hand or with tools. This could be implemented relatively easily, as the additional development required is limited. Dr. Brosh emphasizes that the locking mechanism must not compromise the door’s seal or risk becoming detached and being propelled into the room under substantial blast pressure. During the ground attack, many residents near Gaza had to hold the door handle, and a lock could certainly have helped. This was particularly important because holding the handle exposed them to small arms fire capable of penetrating a standard sheet metal door without additional protection.

  • Internet Connectivity: Many protected rooms have poor reception and connectivity because of their reinforced concrete walls. Relatively simple solutions, such as wired connections or signal boosters, are available and should be considered.

  • Doors with Enhanced Protection: If small arms fire is added to the threats protected rooms must withstand, doors with enhanced protection, whose development has already been completed, should be promoted and further improved. Such doors provide protection against small arms fire and sometimes against explosive charges.

  • Routine Maintenance: Many protected rooms in Israel are inadequately maintained. Doors and steel shutters sometimes fail to close or are difficult to close into a sealed position. Awareness of maintenance should be increased with professional guidance, and the proper functioning of doors, shutters, and associated metalwork must be checked before apartments are handed over. Many people whose renovations compromised their protected rooms and components now regret those changes and face significant efforts to restore them to proper condition, which is not always possible.

  • Periodic Inspections and Certification: When Form 4 approval is obtained for a building, the Civil Defence Authority inspects the protected rooms and their fittings. Its approval is a condition for occupancy. In light of the events of 7 October, periodic inspections, correction of deficiencies, and certification every few years appear to be essential lessons. These inspections could also provide an opportunity to consider replacing a lightweight door with one offering enhanced protection, replacing seals, and making similar improvements. The protected room inspection report used for Form 4 approval illustrates some of the required checks: View the form.

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future

In conclusion,

​

The events of October 7 require expanding the discussion on aspects regarding the protected areas in Israel and their transformation into much more powerful and effective protective spaces. Dr. Brosh emphasizes that we must remember that the infrastructure for the existence of protected spaces in Israel as means that increase national, family and personal resilience, and even enable functional continuity of the economy, are important to society as a whole, not just to individuals within it.

​

The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future
Documents
Back
The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future
bottom of page