The failure of the residential protected space on October 7: Lessons and conclusions for the future
Jan 29, 2024
מאת : איציק סימון
מלחמת חרבות ברזל הציפה שאלות רבות לגבי עמידות מרחבים מוגנים דירתיים (ממ"דים) כנגד איומ ים שאינם תלולי מסלול (כמו רקטות או פצצות מרגמה). בעיקר בשל הפשיטות הרגליות ב-7 לאוקטובר עם הגעת המחבלים עד לדלתות הבתים והממ"דים ביישובי העוטף וערי הדרום.
האם הממ"ד באמת מספק הגנה ראויה כנגד איומים כמו ירי קל, לבנות חבלה, שריפות, עשן ואפילו ירי נ"ט? עד כמה הממ"דים מתאימים לזמני שהות משמעותיים?
על מנת לברר מעט את הנושא נפגשנו לשיחה קצרה עם ד"ר בני ברוש, מומחה למיגון ומרצה להנדסת מבנים במחלקה להנדסה אזרחית באוניברסיטת אריאל ובעברו מנהל אגף הבניין במכון התקנים הישראלי. ד"ר ברוש עוסק בתחום רבות ואף ביקר ביישובי העוטף מתוך מטרה ללמוד, לנתח ולהפיק לקחים בהיבט של תפקוד של הממ"ד בתרחישים התקדימיים. כולל ניסוח המלצות על לקחים אפשריים וגיבוש הצעות לצעדים אופרטיביים שיהיו גם ברי השגה וגם ברי ביצוע.
By: Itzick Simon
The Iron Swords War raised many questions about the resilience of protected residential areas (MAMDIMs) against non-straight-track threats (such as rockets or mortar bombs). Mainly due to the foot raids on October 7th when the terrorists reached the doors of homes and MAMDIMs in the settlements of the encirclement and the cities of the south.
Does the MAMD really provide proper protection against threats such as light gunfire, sabotage, fires, smoke, and even anti-tank fire? To what extent are the MAMDs suitable for significant periods of stay?
In order to clarify the issue a little, we met for a short conversation with Dr. Benny Brosh , a defense expert and lecturer in structural engineering in the Department of Civil Engineering at Ariel University and formerly the director of the Building Division at the Standards Institute of Israel. Dr. Brosh is involved in many areas and even visited the surrounding communities with the aim of studying, analyzing, and drawing lessons from the aspect of the functioning of the MMMD in the precedent scenarios. This includes formulating recommendations on possible lessons and formulating proposals for operational steps that will be both achievable and feasible.
The residential protected space as a security room
First and foremost, Dr. Brosh emphasizes that the issue of the bomb shelters "got caught up" in the events of October 7 because people saw them as safe rooms. "The rush to the bomb shelters was primarily due to the alarms," he explains. "It quickly became clear that the missiles and rockets were not the main threat. A large part of the population found themselves defending themselves in the protected spaces during the ground infiltration. People barricaded themselves in the bomb shelters and in some cases stayed there for dozens of hours."
Until now, when the threats facing us were only conventional and not unconventional (since the first Gulf War), and in most parts of the country they were limited in scope, most of the population did not experience the need to stay in protected spaces for very long (except for sleeping).
"One of the clearest and most prominent conclusions we have regarding battalions after October 7th," says Dr. Brosh, "is the need to adapt them for a much longer stay. It is important to know that this can also be easily done based on the existing and approved regulations, standards, and specifications in the field of civil defense."
בראש ובראשונה ד"ר ברוש מדגיש שנושא הממ"דים "נקלע" לאירועי ה- 7 לאוקטובר מאחר שאנשים ראו בהם חדרי ביטחון. "הריצה לממ"ד הייתה קודם כל בעקבות האזעקות", הוא מסביר, "מהר מאד התברר שהטילים והרקטות הם לא האיום המרכזי. חלק גדול מהאוכלוסייה מצא את עצמו מתגונן במרחבים המוגנים בעת החדירה הקרקעית. אנשים התבצרו בממ"דים ובמקרים מסוימים שהו בהם עשרות שעות".
עד כה, כאשר האיומים שהיו לפתחנו היו קונבנציונאליים בלבד ולא בלתי-קונבנציונאליים (מאז מלחמת המפרץ הראשונה), ובמרבית חלקי הארץ הם היו בהיקף מוגבל, רוב האוכלוסייה לא חוותה צורך לשהייה ארוכה מאוד במרחבים המוגנים (ל מעט שינה).
אחת המסקנות המובהקות והבולטות שיש לנו לגבי ממ"דים אחרי ה-7 לאוקטובר", אומר ד"ר ברוש, "הוא הצורך להתאים אותם לשהות ארוכה הרבה יותר. חשוב לדעת שניתן לעשות את זה בנקל גם על בסיס התקנות, התקנים והמפרטים הקיימים והמאושרים בתחומי המיגון האזרחי".
A residential protected spaces resistance to small arms fire depends on the type of door it has, with two types of doors - regular and "enhanced." Only the enhanced doors, which are thicker, will provide protection against small arms fire depending on its type.
The "enhanced" doors have been on the market for about a decade and are intended for conventional threats with bullets and shrapnel, but most residential protected spaces are not equipped with them . In many cases in the settlements surrounded by bullets, BMDs with regular light doors have been penetrated and caused serious injuries to those inside.
Are the residential protected space protected from small arms fire?
"I arrived near the outbreak of the war for a tour of the surrounding communities that I will never forget," says Dr. Brosh. "We were exposed to cases in which terrorists set fire to the house with the intention of causing death and damage to property, and more than once we saw evidence of attempts to break into the MMAD using explosives and mainly building sabotage."
The fire usually did not penetrate into the BM when the doors remained closed, although the smoke, which is dangerous in itself, sometimes penetrated. Possibly through open ventilation ducts. The penetration of the smoke led in certain situations to escape through the window and exposure to terrorists in the open space.
"We found that sealing rubber partially survived even direct fire, in the event that the door was open and exposed to it. When the door was closed and even more sealed, the rubber was very helpful in preventing smoke from entering. Since there is often an external entrance to the fire station, sometimes due to protective walls required by law, the amount of furniture and accessories near the door is sparse, and thus the fire had nothing to hold on to near the fire station door. Ventilation and filtration systems have the power to prevent smoke from entering from within the apartment, as occurred in the ground attack. Similarly, these systems also help reduce smoke penetration due to an operating mechanism that involves creating positive pressure in the room. Ventilation and filtration systems may generally help in refreshing the air and reducing heat load."
Fire and arson resistance of the building
The MMDs in the surrounding settlements and cities in the western Negev have proven resilient in the face of the threats that have come knocking on their doors. On the other hand, there is much room for improvement, and Dr. Brosh points out a number of points that are worth considering going forward:
· Installing a "wet" room that includes a sink, toilet, and shower: Long-stay accommodation units – The events of October 7th emphasized the need to find solutions for long-stay accommodation units. Dr. Brosh believes that accommodation units should include a wet unit with a toilet, sink, and even a shower. He is not the only one, by the way, and a bill was recently submitted on the subject.
· Deadbolt locking – The option to lock a door, especially from the inside, already exists on most apartment doors in Israel. Deadbolt door locking may prevent manual or mechanical break-ins. This is a solution that can be implemented relatively easily because the additional development required is not large. Dr. Brosh emphasizes that it is necessary to ensure that the locking device will not damage the door's tightness and will not be one that could detach from the door and be thrown into the room under the door at a high level. During the ground raid, many residents in the enclosure were forced to hold the handle and a lock could certainly have helped. Especially when holding the handle involved exposure to small arms fire that penetrates a tin door that is not "enhanced."
· Internet communication – Many military bases suffer from reception and communication problems due to the reinforced concrete walls. There are relatively simple solutions to this problem, such as wired connections or amplifiers that should be considered for installation.
· "Enhanced" doors – If it is decided that the threat of small arms fire will join the other threats that the MMAD is required to face, reinforced doors whose development has been completed are an element that must be promoted and even improved. A reinforced door provides protection against small arms and sometimes even against sabotage and explosive devices.
· Regular maintenance – Many apartment buildings in Israel are not properly maintained. Sometimes the door does not close or closes with difficulty to a sealed state, as does the steel window. It is recommended to increase awareness of the issue of maintenance based on professional factors and in any case to be careful to check the integrity of the frame products before handing over the apartments. Many of those who carried out renovations and "sabotaged" the integrity and level of protection of the apartment building and its components are now guilty of a sin, and efforts are required to restore the apartment building to its suitability – which is not always possible.
Periodic inspections and approvals of proper operation – At the stage of receiving Form 4 for the building, the inspection of the proper operation of the building and its accessories is carried out by the GA, and the GA's approval is a condition for occupancy. In light of the events of October 7, it seems that performing a periodic inspection, repairing the rejects and receiving a proper operation certificate once every few years is mandatory as one of the lessons learned. At this stage, it will be possible to consider replacing a light door with a reinforced door, replacing rubber seals, etc. See the form for the MMAD Proper Operation Report in order to receive Form 4, from which you can learn about some of the necessary inspections - link
Points for improvement and thinking for the future
In conclusion,
The events of October 7 require expanding the discussion on aspects regarding the protected areas in Israel and their transformation into much more powerful and effective protective spaces. Dr. Brosh emphasizes that we must remember that the infrastructure for the existence of protected spaces in Israel as means that increase national, family and personal resilience, and even enable functional continuity of the economy, are important to society as a whole, not just to individuals within it.
אירועי ה-7 לאוקטובר מחייבים להרחיב את הדיון על היבטים לגבי הממ"דים בישראל והפיכתם למרחבי הגנה עוצמתיים ואפקטיביים הרבה יותר. ד"ר ברוש מדגיש שעלינו לזכור שתשתית קיום המרחבים המוגנים בישראל כאמצעים שמגבירים את החוסן הלאומי, המשפחתי והאישי, ואף מאפשרים רציפות תפקודית של המשק, חשובים לחברה כולה ולא רק לפרטים בה.
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